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LIBERTY, THE HIGH ER PLEASURES, A N D  MILL'S 
MISSING SCIENCE OF ETHNIC JOKES*
By  E l i j a h  M il l g r a m
I. I n t r o d u c t i o n
The intended contribution to his moral theory of John Stuart Mill's 
famous distinction between higher and lower pleasures has occasioned 
long-standing puzzlement on the part of his more alert interpreters. I am 
going to explain how the distinction was meant, among other things, to 
allow Mill to demonstrate that liberty really is required by the Principle 
of Utility but I will also suggest that the argument made possible by the 
notion of higher pleasures was not the one that Mill in the end wanted. 
My objective here is to distinguish two problems which—viewed at a 
suitable level of abstraction—we share with Mill: one is that of determin­
ing whether a society hoping to promote the happiness of its members 
should allow them liberty and the other, that of accounting for the impor­
tance, both for happiness and for liberty, of genuinely original personal­
ities. The general drift of my discussion will be that the former problem 
is relatively tractable, and Mill's understanding of the higher and lower 
pleasures contains the resources for a straightforward solution to his 
version of it; the latter problem, however, is a great deal more difficult, 
both for him and for us.
I will begin by discussing what the distinction between higher and 
lower pleasures is meant to do. I will remark on a number of architectural 
features of Mill's philosophical system which seem to me to have received 
insufficient attention, most centrally, Mill's generally unnoticed account 
of the psychological implementation of higher pleasures. With that in 
mind, I will explain how they can perform the mission Mill had first 
assigned them, and I will briefly consider a biographical question: What 
might have predisposed Mill to give the higher pleasures the pivotal 
theoretical role they have in his work?
Then I will turn to considerations having to do with individuality and 
originality. Although Mill gave these a great deal of emphasis, they are 
absent from the argument that I will by this point have reconstructed; by
* I am  grateful to Chrisoula Anctreou, Alyssa Bernstein, Sarah Buss, Leslie Francis, C handran 
Kukathas, and C andace Vogler for com m ents on drafts, and to Pepe Chang, Clif McIntosh, 
Lex Newm an, and audiences at the University of Miami, the University of Southam pton, 
and Sheffield University for helpful discussion. A m uch earlier version of som e of this 
m aterial benefited from  conversation w ith Carla Bagnoli and M aria M erritt. In addition, m y 
thanks to the University of U tah 's  College of H um anities for sabbatical-year support.
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way of explaining why they prove so difficult to accommodate, I will 
suggest a reason Mill might have abandoned his projected sciences of 
character. I will take my leave by asking what we can learn from Mill's 
failure to turn his implementation analysis of the higher pleasures into an 
argument expressing the importance of individuality and originality.
II. T h e  H i g h e r  P l e a s u r e s
Mill introduces higher pleasures as those which experienced judges 
lexically prefer. A lexical ranking—contemporary terminology, not 
Mill's—is one that resembles alphabetization in the following respect: 
Letters in the second position only make a difference to the alphabet­
ical ordering of two words if the letters in the first position are the 
same; if the first letter of one word is "j," and the first letter of another 
word is "k," the former word will precede the latter word, no matter 
what their remaining letters are. Analogously, if one kind of pleasure is 
lexically ranked over another, then varying amounts of the latter, out­
ranked pleasure will make a difference to the overall assessment of 
two options only if both options deliver the same in the way of the 
former kind of pleasure.1
The standard and almost correct formulation of Mill's distinction between 
higher and lower pleasures is that if all (or anyway most) of those who 
have experienced both A and B prefer any amount, however small, of A, 
to any amount, however large, of B, then A is the higher pleasure.2 This 
is sometimes called the "decided preference criterion."
Even a cursory acquaintance with Mill's moral and political philosophy 
will suggest that this distinction must be doing a great deal of work for 
him. First, Mill was a utilitarian, and utilitarians opt for the greatest good 
for the greatest number; they interpret that to mean the most happiness, 
and, in Mill's time, identified happiness with pleasure. Aldous Huxley 
was not alone in taking utilitarians to be committed to a Brave New 
World: wouldn't a totalitarian regime administering euphoria-inducing
1 For a standard  in troduction to the concept, see Eric W eisstein, "Lexicographic O rd er/' in 
MathWorld (Wolfram Research, 1999, h ttp ://m athw orld .w olfram .com /L exicographicO rder. 
html).
2 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, chap. 2, paragraphs 5, 8, and 10 [X:211, 213f.]. In all 
citations of M ill's works, bracketed references indicate volum e and page num bers in John 
Stuart Mill, Collected Works (Toronto/London: University of Toronto P ress/R outledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1967-1989). Being a h igher pleasure is, on M ill's definition, a relational p rop­
erty: a pleasure is h igher w ith  respect to a specific contrasting pleasure; that latter pleasure 
is low er w ith  respect to the former. This m eans that, in principle, a pleasure could be h igher 
w ith  respect to another pleasure, while being lower w ith  respect to a third. Mill, however, 
typically w rote as though pleasures fell into two classes, the h igher and the lower (that is, he 
w rote as though "higher" and "low er" w ere m onadic predicates). I will in due  course 
consider bo th  w hy he m ight have allow ed him self this w ay of pu tting  things, and w hat 
further issues m ight tu rn  on it. Following up on m y description of the standard  version of 
the decided-preference criterion as "alm ost correct," I w ill also explain w hy talk of amounts 
of a h igher pleasure is im portantly  m isleading.
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drugs and elaborate but shallow pastimes be the surest and most efficient 
path to a maximum of pleasures?3 But we know that Mill thought other­
wise, and insisted that liberty outweighs any amount whatsoever of the 
goods that might be gained by sacrificing it. The only device in his bag of 
tricks that allows a good to be ranked over other goods in this way is the 
distinction between higher and lower pleasures. So we should expect 
Mill's argument for a liberal political order to invoke this distinction.
Second, the distinction between higher and lower pleasures is intro­
duced in chapter 2 of Utilitarianism, where Mill also introduces what was 
widely felt to be a pressing objection to the view:
Utility is often summarily stigmatized as an immoral doctrine by 
giving it the name of Expediency and taking advantage of the pop­
ular use of that term to contrast it with Principle.
We are told that an utilitarian will be apt to make his own particular 
case an exception to the moral rules, and, when under temptation, 
will see an utility in the breach of a rule, greater than he will see in 
its observance.4
In Mill's time, and for a long time after, popular authors would depict 
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis as issuing in judgments like this one: Mur­
dering a wealthy recluse for her money is not just morally permissible, 
but positively required, provided that the money will subsequently be 
devoted to charity. (As one of Dostoyevsky's bit characters vividly puts it, 
"One death, and a hundred lives in exchange—it's simple arithmetic!")5
3 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (New York: H arperPerennial, 1932/1998); sim ilar com ­
plaints can be found in James G unn, The Joy Makers (New York: Bantam, 1961). For a 
representative acknow ledgm ent of the problem  by an academic, here w riting for a popular 
audience, see John Skorupski, Why Read Mill Today? (New York: Routledge, 2006), 61, 76.
4 Mill, Utilitarianism, chap. 2, paragraphs 23, 25 [X:223, 225],
5 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment, trans. Constance G arnett (New York: Ban­
tam Books, 1962), 58f. D uring the tw entieth  century, the device m ost used to address this 
problem  was rule-utilitarianism , the idea being that w hat got your moral theory into trouble 
was testing the particular action for its effects on utility, rather than testing the rule the 
action is subsum ed by. (The rule "Kill miserly old wom en for their m oney" w ou ldn 't look 
nearly as good, even to Dostoyevsky's student.) Act-utilitarians and rule-utilitarians argued 
for decades, am ong o ther things over w hich view  to attribute to Mill. That debate was, in 
my view, a mistake: both interpretations are unhelpful anachronisms.
In M ill's schem e of things, w hether a choice prom otes utility depends on the preferences 
of experienced judges. Now, as a m atter of psychological fact, the objects of preference are 
som etim es m ore and som etim es less particular. Around election time, for exam ple, voters 
develop preferences over particular candidates; they also often have m uch m ore general 
preferences, exhibited in choices of rules about how  to vote (e.g., straight ticket). Thus, the 
judgm ents derived from the preferences of the experienced will som etim es look more like 
act-utilitarian guidelines, and som etim es m ore like rule-utilitarian guidelines. (That is not to 
say that w e will not som etim es find the contrast betw een "acting on general rules" and 
"m easuring the consequences of each act"; these phrases are quoted from a letter Mill w rote 
to George Grote [Collected Works, XV:762].)
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Mill provides a parrying response to the objection over the remainder of 
the paragraph last quoted, but saves his principled treatment (which I 
will reconstruct in Section V) for the final chapter of the book, where he 
argues that utilitarianism makes a lexical priority of security. And that 
must mean arguing that security (or "justice") is a higher pleasure (or 
perhaps a necessary precondition for higher pleasures).
Evidently, we ought not to think that we understand Mill's moral and 
political views, or his arguments for them, until we understand what a 
higher pleasure is. And conversely, I take it that the more difficult puzzle 
of the two I have just now mentioned —that of how Mill was able to think 
of his Principle of Liberty as compatible with his Principle of Utility—is 
a touchstone for having successfully reconstructed the distinction between 
higher and lower pleasures.6
Some of Mill's readers have taken his sorting of particular pleasures 
into higher and lower—sex and eating are lower, great literature and 
poetry are higher—to be no more than expressions of Victorian middle- 
class snobbery and prudishness. Perhaps a secondary check on whether 
we do understand his distinction is being able to give a more sympathetic 
explanation of how such pleasures were classified.
III . T h e  A s s o c i a t i o n i s t  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  a  H i g h e r  P l e a s u r e
The official and formal definition of a higher pleasure does nothing to 
explain to us zvhy the particular pleasures Mill claimed to be the higher 
ones are. But Mill was a British Empiricist as well as a utilitarian, and 
British Empiricism was a research program built around a distinctive 
psychological theory. If Mill's arguments turn on the claim that experi­
enced judges, as a matter of psychological fact, lexically rank some plea­
H ere's w hy  the debate w as unhelpfully anachronistic. The tw entieth-century debate came 
to a close w ith  D avid Lyons, The Forms and Limits o f Utilitarianism (Oxford: C larendon Press, 
1965), w hich argued that, as rules get m ore contoured, rule-utilitarianism  collapses back into 
act-utilitarianism . That argum ent w orks because there are no  lim its to the com plexity of a 
rule, and that presupposition w as allowable because tw entieth-century ethics h ad  taken the 
same antipsychologistic tu rn  as tw entieth-century logic. Because M ill's experienced judges 
will no t form  preferences over arbitrarily complex rules, the collapse of rule-utilitarianism  
into act-utilitarianism  is preem pted. That is, w hen  you insist on fram ing your treatm ent of 
Mill in these anachronistic terms, you bypass the very  m aterial that allows Mill to do  better 
than the parties to the tw entieth-century debate did.
6 Here is an  indication of just how  difficult the puzzle has seemed. As thoughtful a reader 
as G ertrude Him m elfarb (On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case o f John Stuart Mill [San Fran­
cisco: Institute for C ontem porary Studies Press, 1990]) w as driven to the view  that On 
Liberty and  Utilitarianism are irreconcilable, and that their incom patibility is to be explained 
by  a ttributing the tw o books to different authors: the team  consisting of Mill and Harriet 
Taylor in the one case, and  Mill on his ow n in the other. Since the two volum es w ere in the 
w orks at about the same time in M ill's life, since On Liberty explicitly acknow ledges "utility  
as the ultim ate appeal on all ethical questions" (chap. 1, par. 11 [XVIII:224]), and since the 
last chapter of Utilitarianism takes the first steps tow ard protecting indiv iduals from the kind 
of oppressive m easures that m ight seem  to follow from the Principle of Utility, and thus is 
natu rally  regarded as a segue to On Liberty, this is an exegetical last resort.
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sures over others, we should expect there to be a psychological explanation 
for lexical rankings generally. More narrowly we should expect Mill to 
have had in mind psychological arguments designed to show that the 
particular pleasures which he took to be higher would indeed be lexically 
preferred to competing pleasures.
In fact, Mill is methodologically committed to producing such expla­
nations. Mill's moral and political arguments require that what he takes 
to be the higher pleasures remain so even in novel social environments, in 
particular, in the improved social arrangements which utilitarians hoped 
to bring about; he is not trying to show that justice (or security) and 
liberty are goods only in our imperfect political world, but that someday 
we will no longer need them. Now, if the claim that, say, autonomy, or 
highly complex activity, or personal security are higher pleasures were 
merely an observation (perhaps of the choice behavior of suitably expe­
rienced judges), it would count as what Mill called an empirical law.' But
'  And that is the way reconstructions of M ill's argum ents have, by and large, treated such 
claims. For the past few decades, the gaps have been filled in by appeal to w hat John Rawls, 
A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U niversity Press, 1971), 426f., called the Aris­
totelian Principle: the idea that, "o ther things equal, hum an beings enjoy the exercise of their 
realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoym ent increases the more 
the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity." Rawls claims that "Mill comes very 
close to stating [the Aristotelian Principle] in Utilitarianism, ch. II, pars. 4-8," and Rawls 
further describes it as "a principle of m otivation . . . [which] expresses a psychological law 
governing changes in the pattern  of our desires." But the claim that hum ans prefer more 
complex activities is supported  neither by argum ent for the Aristotelian Principle of the sort 
that w ould make it compelling to a present-day audience, nor by reconstructed Millian 
argum entation that w ould justify attributing  it to Mill. Rather, it is introduced by Rawls as 
a platitude.
In a very sim ilar vein, John Gray, "M ill's Conception of H appiness and the Theory of 
Individuality," in John Gray and G. W. Smith, eds., J. S. Mill's On liberty in focus (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 200, 209, treats as obvious the claim that the "actualisation of [his unique 
range of] potentialities is indispensible for any m an 's greatest well-being," allows that a 
sim ilar claim regarding autonom y m ight, for all w e know, be found false in the future, and 
states that autonom y and authenticity are required for a happy life—but w ithout providing 
anything like a tight Millian argum ent for these claims (compare also John Gray, Mill on 
liberty: A Defense, 2d ed. [New York: Routledge, 1996], chap. 4).
Representative recent discussion of the distinction betw een higher and lower pleasures 
includes: Jonathan Riley, "Is Q ualitative Hedonism  Incoherent?" Utilitas 11, no. 3 (1999); 
Riley, "Interpreting M ill's Qualitative Hedonism ," Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 212 (2003); 
Riley, "O n Quantities and Qualities of Pleasure," Utilitas 5, no. 2 (1993); G ustaf A rrhenius 
and W lodek Rabinowicz, "Millian Superiorities," Utilitas 17, no. 2 (2005); Christoph Schmidt- 
Petri, "Mill on Quality and Quantity," Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 210 (2003); John 
Skorupski, "Q uality of Well-Being: Quality of Being," in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, 
eds., Well-Being and Morality (Oxford: Oxford U niversity Press, 2000), 244f. I am unhappy 
with these treatm ents (to the extent that they fram e them selves as reconstructions or 
explications of M ill—which, to be sure, not all do). Their focus tends to be on w hat the 
right m athem atical m odel for Millian higher p leasures is: for exam ple, w hether higher 
p leasures are infinitely more valuable than lower ones. But, first, Mill did not himself 
think about these problem s by try ing to find m athem atical m odels for them; rather, he 
explored psychological im plem entation issues. The com plaint is not just that m uch of the 
current discussion is anachronistic, bu t that some of the disagreem ent in it is merely 
apparent. Since Mill did not think in these term s himself, any m odel that reproduces the 
right ou tpu ts, in this case lexical preferences, is as good as any other. Second, although
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"until an uniformity can . . .  be taken out of the class of empirical laws, 
and brought either into that of laws of causation or the demonstrated 
results of laws of causation, it cannot with an assurance be pronounced 
true beyond the local and other limits within which it has been found so 
by actual observation."8 In other words, unless his claims about the 
higher pleasures can be underwritten by his psychology, Mill cannot use 
them as he does in his political arguments. So we must assume that he 
thought they could be.
Now in the earlier Empiricists, the psychological theory had two dis­
tinct components: a resemblance-based theory of content (the so-called 
Theory of Ideas, on which thoughts were something on the order of 
mental pictures) and associationism. Mill, sensitive both to the tensions 
between the components, and to the insuperable difficulties of an account 
of content that was based on pictorial resemblance, took pains to replace 
the Theory of Ideas with an improved and associationist account of con­
tent.9 That left associationist psychological theory as the engine of the 
Empiricist research program. So the arguments we are looking for will 
deploy the theoretical machinery of associationism.
Associationism was an intellectual ancestor of mid-twentieth-century 
behaviorism and of contemporary connectionism; it differed from behav­
iorism in studying conditioning effects within the mind, and not merely 
between external stimuli and behavioral responses; it differed from con­
nectionism in that representation was not understood as distributed.10 In 
Mill's version of associationism, ideas (the mental states that are not 
themselves sensations or feelings) are linked by associative connections, 
and pleasure and pain traverse those connections. If you find thinking of 
x pleasant, and you associate x with y, then after a while, thinking of y will
Mill does occasionally appeal to infinities (especially in his treatm ent of na tu ra l k inds in 
A System o f l.ogic, book I, chap. vii, sec. 4, in Mill, Collected Works, VIL122-26), our 
comfort level w ith the concept of infinity, and our willingness to treat it as a reliable 
m athem atical tool, is a side effect of that set theory class we all took in college. Before 
Cantor, infinity was felt to be a philosophical and m athem atical problem, no t a resource.
So appealing to its infinitely greater value to explain w hy an object of preference is 
lexically higher-ranked than another is perhaps useful shorthand for us, bu t unlikely to 
be following M ill's ow n train of thought. However, I will have occasion to discuss one of 
the them es of this literature below, namely, w hether M ill's distinction is, as the parties to 
the d ispu te  tend to p u t it, qualitative or m erely quantitative.
8 Mill, A System of l.ogic, book III, chap. xvii, sec. 1 [VII:525].
9 Mill, A System of l.ogic, book I, chap. v, secs. 4-7 [VII:97-108]. The replacem ent was not 
thorough, and I will return  to the distinction betw een im pressions and ideas in Section VII 
below.
10 Paul T hagard 's quasi-connectionist netw orks, in which each node  represents a propo­
sition or goal, are very close in spirit to M ill's associationist m odels of cognition. (In full- 
fledged connectionist netw orks, contents are n o t located at single nodes.) See Paul Thagard, 
"Explanatory Coherence," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1989): 435-67; and  Thagard, 
"H ow  to M ake Decisions," in Varieties o f Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah M illgram  (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2001).
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be pleasant, too. To desire something is to find the idea of it pleasant.11 If 
you had a happy childhood in some neighborhood, you may find your­
self liking the place (which you associate with the happy events), coming 
back to it after you've moved away, and thinking about it nostalgically. If 
you survive a plane crash (even just one: according to Mill, pain makes 
stronger associations form faster), you may no longer be able to make 
yourself get on a plane. Now, according to associationist psychological 
theory, how could something come to function as a higher pleasure in 
somebody's life?
Mill was a prolific writer, willing and able to write his way through just 
about any topic for which he had a theoretical use. His collected works fill 
some thirty-three hefty volumes. If psychological theory was as central to 
his views as I am claiming, where is Mill's book on the subject? As it 
happens, John Stuart Mill's father, James Mill, had written a textbook 
treatment of associationism, the Analysis o f  the Phenomena o f  the Human 
Mind. (To help keep them straight: a standalone "Mill" will always refer 
to John Stuart Mill.) Janice Carlisle points out that the very young Mill 
served as an "unacknowledged research assistant" on his father's project, 
writing out chapter-by-chapter abstracts of earlier work in the tradition of 
Empiricist psychology and reading draft chapters.12 If John Stuart Mill 
never wrote up his own exposition of the science of psychology, it was 
because he thought the job had already been done for him (and where he 
thought it had not been done right, his second edition of his father's book 
added lengthy footnotes in which he corrected the author on the points 
where they disagreed). So we can treat the Analysis as giving us both the 
Mills' psychological views.
And, indeed, the treatment of the phenomenon we are examining appears 
in the Analysis, perhaps disconcertingly, as Mill's explanation of how one 
becomes a miser. A miser is someone who values money over anything he 
could buy with it; that's why he hangs on to the money. So a miser acts 
as though money is a higher pleasure. James Mill writes:
11 M ore carefully, a desire consists in the idea of p leasure associated w ith  the idea of 
the object of the desire. Mill took this definition over from his father, and noticed that it 
w o u ld n 't do  as it was. (Janies Mill, Analysis o f the Phenomena o f the Human Mind [London: 
Longmans, 1869], vol. 2, 191f.; I w ill refer to this w ork  below as the Analysis. See p. 258 
for a similar definition of "m otive.") Even if you specify that the object of the desire lies 
in the future, w hat you get looks like hope or w ish or even just expectation, rather than 
desire. However, Mill never adjusted the account of desire he  had inherited to handle  the 
objection.
12 Janice Carlisle, John Stuart Mill and the Writing o f Character (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1991), 18f.; Mill, Autobiography, chap. 3, par. 5, in Mill, Collected Works, 1:71, 73. 
A reading group in w hich Mill participated subsequently w orked its w ay through the 
Analysis (Mill, Autobiography, chap. 4, par. 20 [1:127]). In a eulogizing passage in the Auto­
biography, Mill praises his father for "w hat he  achieved in . . .  analytic psychology.. . .  [H]e 
will be know n to posterity  as one of the greatest nam es in that m ost im portant branch of 
speculation" (ibid., chap. 6, par. 11 [1:213]).
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Wealth . . .  afford [s] perhaps the most remarkable of all examples of 
that extraordinary case of association, where the means to an end, 
means valuable to us solely on account of their end, not only engross 
more of our attention than the end itself, but actually supplant it in 
our affections.13
Here is the explanation of the phenomenon given by Mill fils:
[W]hen a grand cause of pleasures has been associated with a great 
many pleasures, and a great many times, the association acquires a 
peculiar character and strength. The idea of the cause, as cause, is so 
lost among the innumerable ideas of the pleasures combined with it, 
that it seems to become the idea of pleasure itself.. . .  Many are the 
instances in which the association of pleasures with money consti­
tutes so vehement an affection that it is an overmatch for all others.14
13 Mill, Analysis, vol. 2, 215, which also adduces pow er and dignity as examples; John 
Stuart Mill endorses them  as "alm ost perfect" (233n.). See also ibid., vol. 2, 188 (on 
"m oney . . .  hugged as a good in itself"), and 233n. on how  "persons, things, and posi­
tions becom e in them selves pleasant to us by association; and, through the m ultitude 
and variety of the pleasurable ideas associated with them , becom e pleasures of greater 
constancy and even intensity, and altogether more valuable to us, than any of the  prim ­
itive pleasures of ou r constitution . . .  as the love of weal t h . . . (The point of the extra 
docum entation here and below  is to dem onstrate th a t the account of miserliness is not 
just a throw aw ay; it turns up again and again, and it was evidently im portant in the 
younger M ill's thinking.)
14 Ibid., vol. 2, 266. Mill notes the qualitative difference in the resulting feeling a t 321. 
(Because John Stuart M ill's notes are quite long—som etim es as long as tw enty pages—in 
cases like these I will give the page rather than the  num ber of the  note.) Here is his father's 
version of the  explanation: "Money, for exam ple, instrum ental in procuring the  causes of 
alm ost all o u r pleasures, and rem oving the  causes of a large proportion of o u r pains, is 
associated with the  ideas of m ost of the pleasurable states of ou r nature. The idea of an 
object associated with a hundred tim es as m any pleasures as another, is of course a hundred 
tim es m ore interesting" (ibid., vol. 2, 206f., endorsed yet again by the son a t 236n.).
Discussion of the psychological phenom enon in question is not confined to the Analysis. 
In his Principles o f Political Economy, John Stuart Mill gives a related explanation for the 
once-popular economic doctrine of mercantilism: "As it is alw ays by m eans of money that 
people provide for their different necessities, there grow s up  in their m inds a powerful 
association leading them  to regard m oney as w ealth in a m ore peculiar sense than  any other 
article; and even those w ho pass their lives in the  production of the m ost useful objects, 
acquire the  habit of regarding those objects as chiefly im portant by their capacity of being 
exchanged for money. A person w ho parts with m oney to  obtain comm odities, unless he 
intends to sell them , appears to  the imagination to be m aking a worse bargain than a person 
w ho parts with com m odities to get money; the one seems to be spending his m eans, the 
o ther add ing  to them . Illusions which, though now in som e m easure dispelled, were long 
powerful enough to  overm aster the  m ind of every politician, both speculative and practical, 
in Europe" (Mill, Collected Works, III:505f.).
Here is further discussion in An Examination o f Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: " [A sso ­
ciation can generate new  mental affections. Let us take, as one of the obvious exam ples, the 
love of money. Does any one th ink that m oney has intrinsically, by its own nature, any more 
value to us than the first shining pebbles we pick up, except for the things it will purchase? 
Yet its association with these things not only makes it desired for itself, bu t creates in m any 
m inds a passionate love of it, far surpassing the  desire they feel for any of the uses to  which 
it can be p u t"  (Mill, Collected Works, IX:284n.).
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F ig u r e  1. The Associationist Implementation o f a Lexical Preference
The miser constructs associative links between his idea of, say, five 
dollars and his ideas of each of the many things he could buy with five 
dollars: a bubble tea, a cappuccino, a used paperback, and so on. Since 
each of those items is a pleasure (that is, the idea of it is pleasant), the 
feeling of pleasure traverses those associative links and attaches itself to 
the idea of the five dollars. (See figure 1.) Consequently that idea becomes 
pleasant also, which is to say that the miser now desires his five dollars. 
But because the idea of the money is accumulating feelings of pleasure 
transmitted over each of the links, it ends up being a more pleasant idea 
than the ideas of any of the goods one could purchase with five dollars. 
That is just to say that the miser desires the money more than anything he 
could buy with it; when offered a choice between money and what it can 
buy, he will prefer the money.15
Finally, in a letter to Theodor Gom perz, Mill recom m ends "arguing questions [in eco­
nomics] at first on the supposition of barter, in order to adjourn the difficulties which arise 
from the w rong and confused associations which cling to the idea of m oney" (Mill, Collected 
Works, XV:859).
15 Is this enough to account for a m iser's generally preferring m oney to w hat m oney can 
buy? After all, no one has had the opportun ity  to  build up  associative links of the sort we 
have just described around the ideas of each sum  of money. I expect that we are to think of 
the m iser either as having perform ed som ething like an induction (each am ount of money 
that I have considered is more valuable than w hat it will buy, so all am ounts are), or as 
entertaining a more indefinite idea of money (rather than one o r another sum  in particular). 
By M ill's lights, each of these options involves the miser in a further cognitive e rro r—I 
mean, over and above the one I am about to describe.
Mill may be overlooking the supplem ental reinforcem ent we are given for riches, power 
and reputation. Being wealthy has m any social rew ards, over and above the actual pur-
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The love of wealth over all else is a mistake, "an effect/' James Mill 
tells us, "of misguided association, which requires the greatest atten­
tion in Education, and Morals," and the opinion was seconded by his 
son, who wrote that the "true value . . .  [of] riches . . .  [is] the worth, 
for comfort or pleasure, of the things which they will buy."16 Money is 
not actually a higher pleasure. The formal criterion, recall, is that money 
would count only if a majority of suitably experienced people were 
misers. Just about everybody who lives in a money economy is suit­
ably experienced, having, on some occasions, traded his money for 
commodities, and, on others, hung onto it. But misers are a vastly 
outnumbered minority and the reason is that the associative links from 
the idea of the money to the ideas of purchasable goods represent an 
exclusive or (an XOR): if you buy one item with your m oney you have 
used it up, and you cannot buy anything else with the money you 
have spent. The miser is behaving as though the links represented an 
AND: as though the money could be exchanged for all of the purchas­
able goods together.17
Because a given amount of money can only be exchanged for one item 
priced at that amount, it is not worth more than one such item. While the 
idea of money may have been, at some stage of each person's education, 
associated with the myriad commodities that money can buy, sooner or 
later most of us learn that you get only what you pay for: the five dollars 
ends up buying us what are only five dollars worth of goods. After this 
lesson has been repeated sufficiently many times, the idea of five dollars 
ends up associated with the pleasure of a single five-dollar purchase; 
misers are rare because the relevant patterns of means-end association 
follow causal connections, and when the misapprehension18 of the causal 
structure that gives rise to the very highly positively connected idea of 
money is corrected, the pleasure ceases to be connected enough to be 
lexically preferred: "Analytic habits . . .  strengthen the associations between 
causes and effects, means and ends, but tend altogether to weaken those 
which are, to speak familiarly a mere matter of feeling."19
Now that we understand how higher pleasures are implemented psy­
chologically we can say what a higher pleasure is going to come out
chases it enables one to make, and these additional rew ards ought, on the M ills' shared 
psychology, to have a further conditioning effect.
J'6 Mill,' Analysis, vol. 2, 215; Mill, Collected Works, 111:810.
17 If Mill were right about the psychological machinery, the mistake w ould be hard to 
avoid: the m iser is falling afoul of the aw kw ardness with which connectionist netw orks 
generally handle trade-offs of this kind.
18 A lbeit not quite the misunderstanding: the m iser do esn 't actually believe that he can buy 
m ore than  his m oney is worth.
ATMs disburse one 's cash, again and again and again, bu t w e d o n 't ever, as far as I know, 
find ATM-misers, people w ho w ould give up the m oney the ATM provides for ATM access 
privileges. On M ill's account, there should be a t least some such people. The moral: D on't 
forget that this is the history of psychology, no t necessarily a plausible psychology for us.
19 John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, chap. 5, par. 4, in Mill, Collected Works, 1:143.
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being: it will work like money to the miser, only, unlike a miser's attach­
ment to money, it will not be a mistake.20
IV . A  B i t  o f  B i o g r a p h y
Let's pause to speculate as to where John Stuart Mill would have encoun­
tered preferences that were lexically ranked in the way he took the higher 
pleasures to be, and why he would have been so impressed as to rely on 
them for theoretical heavy lifting in On Liberty and elsewhere. Many 
readers will have already heard of his unusual upbringing, but I am going 
to rehearse the story in order to make the picture of his home schooling 
as vivid as possible. His father, James Mill, is working at home, writing 
his History o f India. At the other end of the table is his son, John Stuart, 
doing his Greek homework. Little John Stuart never plays with other 
children (he reached his teens before being told that other children didn't 
have an education like his), never plays games, and never learns (his 
whole life long) to tie his shoes. He reads Plato, Gibbon's Decline and Fall 
o f  the Roman Empire, and William Robertson's History o f  Scotland. He does 
his exercises. Alexander Pope's translation of the Iliad, he later wrote,
became [at age eight] one of the books in which for many years I 
most delighted: I think I must have read it from twenty to thirty 
times through. I should not have thought it worth while to mention 
a taste apparently so natural to boyhood, if I had not . . . observed 
that the keen enjoyment of this brilliant specimen of narrative and 
versification is not so universal with boys. . . .21
That in itself tells us a great deal about Mill's childhood: you have to 
have a pretty dry reading list (and not much to engage your attention,
20 H ow  can som eone w ho w an ts to use preferences as the bottom  line, and w ho gives this 
sort of account of how  they are shaped, be in a position to regard som e of them  as mistaken? 
Mill is in an aw kw ard position, one w hich m ay  or m ay no t be sustainable. Since our concern 
here is w hether the aw kw ardness is a reason to think w e are m isreading him , notice that it 
is a varian t of a position standard ly  adopted  by inform ed-desire theorists. Such inform ed- 
desire o r inform ed-preference theorists take desires or preferences to be the bottom  line: 
som ething is good for you because you desire it, and not, e.g., because it is objectively 
valuable. Typically, such theorists insist that practical reasoning consists exclusively in 
m eans-end reasoning, bu t they are unw illing to insist that your desires and preferences 
never need correcting. So they take the benchm ark to be the desires you w ould  have if, say, 
you knew  more. Mill is executing the sam e m aneuver, using the preferences of other, m ore 
experienced people as his w ay  of allowing for a preference to tu rn  out to be m istaken. M ill's 
reasons for doing it h is way, rather than taking the currently m ore popu lar counterfactual- 
based approach, are reconstructed in Elijah M illgram, F.thics Done Right: Practical Reasoning 
as a Foundation for Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 2005), 82f., at 
n. 27.
21 Mill, Autobiography, chap. 1, par. 7 [1:13-15].
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other than your reading list) for Pope (or Homer) to look this good to you, 
as an eight-year-old.
John Stuart Mill's father was dour (someone who, his son tells us, 
although a utilitarian, didn 't really believe in pleasure), and a strict dis­
ciplinarian. Adults by and large have it left up to them how they run (at 
any rate) the details of their lives. Schoolchildren live inside a rather 
controlling institution, but they tend to get lost in the crowd. The young 
Mill, by contrast, had a full-time personal supervisor: he was hardly ever 
out of James Mill's sight, and his father-cum-babysitter was continually 
making him do one thing after another: conjugate Greek verbs, solve 
mathematics problems with inadequate explanation, summarize chapters 
in history books, and much more of the same. As a child, John Stuart Mill 
was practically never allowed to do anything because he wanted to, or 
chose to, or felt like it. He did everything because he was required to, and 
that is worth bearing in mind as a motivation for the arguments Mill 
constructed later on in life, for the freedom to do anything you want that 
doesn't actually harm anyone else.
Let's fill in the dramatized picture of Mill's early education a little 
more. Each time little John Stuart fails at a task, or is frustrated at it, his 
father sternly and abruptly corrects him, and (recall how close his father's 
psychological theory was to behaviorism) other rewards and punish­
ments are presumably administered on the basis of praise and blame.22 
Blame is being associatively connected with all those brief unhappy 
moments. So the feeling of pain will traverse those many links, and after 
a while, blame (or maybe his father's blame) is going to be—extending the 
terminology we have been given—a "higher pain": something Mill would 
do anything to avoid. As his father put it, discussing the "association 
[that] constitutes . . .  the feeling . . .  of Praiseworthiness, and Blamewor­
thiness . . .  : In some men it exists in so great a degree of strength, t ha t . . .  
every other feeling of their nature, is subdued by it."23 While praise 
might have been turned into a higher pleasure in the same way, we are 
told that Mill's "recollection of such matters is almost wholly of failures, 
hardly ever of success":24 James Mill must have rarely praised his child.
That is a guess, on my part, as to how John Stuart Mill first learned 
about the higher pleasures, about how lexically ranked preferences were 
formed, and about how effective they could be. It would have been the 
drawn out and painful lesson of his childhood that there are experiences 
which, once lived through, prevent one from trading off competing options.
22 The younger Mill quotes his father on the role of praise and blam e in parental peda­
gogy in the Analysis, vol. 2, 314, and remarks, in a tone that conveys the deep im pression it 
m ade on him, on "the desire [James Mill] m ade [the m inds he came in contact w ith] feel for 
his approbation, the sham e a t his disapproval" (Mill, Autobiography, chap. 4, par. 7 [1:105]). 
Com pare also ibid., chap. 5, par. 4 [1:141], on his teachers' overreliance on "the old familiar 
instrum ents, praise and blame, reward and punishm ent."
23 Mill, Analysis, vol. 2, 298f.
24 Mill, Autobiography, chap. 1, par. 22 [1:35].
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(After enough of such training, you would do anything rather than expose 
yourself to even a little bit of this kind of correction.) The turn to psy­
chologically entrenched lexically ordered preferences, and Mill's convic­
tion that they could make a dependable armature for a utilitarian but 
liberal social order, was most likely an echo of his own formative years.
V. H i g h e r  P l e a s u r e s  a s  N o n d e p l e t a b l e  G o o d s
Miserliness involves a cognitive error, but psychological structures of 
this general shape do not always amount to a mistake. While money gets 
used up, what I am going to claim were the higher pleasures theoretically 
most important to Mill do not.
Recall that justice was to be protected from utilitarian cost-benefit cal­
culations by being made a lexical priority. Justice consists in honoring 
rights, rights being those expectations which society ought to defend, 
come what may. Now, all nonmomentary goods depend on the posses­
sion of rights: "nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of any 
worth to us, if we could be deprived of everything the next instant by 
whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves." This dependence 
makes us feel very strongly about the abrogation of rights, and not just of 
our own rights: we feel "a thirst for retaliation" whenever "the machinery 
for providing [the rights] . . .  is [not] kept unintermittedly in active play." 
The feelings are "so much more intense than those concerned in any of 
the more common cases of utility, that the difference in degree . . .  becomes 
a real difference in kind . . .  assum ing] [a] character of absoluteness." 
Thus, the possession of such rights is a higher pleasure. And thus, justice 
will be preferred to any of the other common cases of utility; it is always 
the preferred option, from the utilitarian point of view.25
Justice (security in our expectations, in knowing that the rules are fixed, 
even when it is inconvenient to others) is a means to all other nontrivial 
pleasures, and so the feeling of pleasure traverses the many associative 
links representing those means-end connections. It accumulates at the 
idea of justice, eventually becoming more intense than the pleasure asso­
ciated with any of the ideas at the other ends of those links; justice, 
accordingly, turns out to be preferred to any of the particular goods for
25 The quotes in this stretch of argum ent are from Mill, Utilitarianism, chap. 5, par. 24 
[X:250f], As the gesture at inform ed-desire theory in  no te  20 m ay  rem ind us, the appeal to 
w hat, as a m atter of psychological fact, people prefer is m eant to sidestep question-begging 
appeals to w hat they should prefer. N onetheless, som e such circularity m ay  rem ain in these 
argum ents. Presumably, there are conceivable environm ents in w hich justice and liberty 
w ould  no t tu rn  ou t to be h igher pleasures: perhaps those in w hich justice and liberty are 
consistently associated w ith  electric shocks. (Think of the dogs in  learned helplessness 
experim ents; see C hristopher Peterson, Steven Maier, and M artin Seligman, Learned Help­
lessness [Oxford: Oxford U niversity Press, 1993].) W hy do w e disregard those environm ents 
w hen  w e are considering w hich pleasures count as higher, especially since those classifica­
tions are being deployed in an argum ent about w h a t social environm ents are to be brought 
about?
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which it is a necessary precondition. The psychological structures thus 
resemble those of the miser. Notice, however, that unlike any finite amount 
of money, justice is a nondepletable good: when justice has secured one 
further pleasure for you, you have (as Locke once put it, albeit in a rather 
different connection) "enough, and as good, left." The mistake the miser 
is making is, in this case, no mistake at all.
The phenomenon of a general-purpose means correctly coming to seem 
more important than any of the ends which it might be used to attain is 
pervasive. Another striking example is material objects, which Mill under­
stood as "Permanent Possibilities of Sensation." Mill's phenomenalist 
analysis is very close to that of C. I. Lewis's now more familiar view: a 
piece of paper's being on the table, for instance, is a matter of the sensa­
tions I would have if I went back into the room and looked—and many 
other counterfactual conditionals of the same ilk.26 Mill does not himself 
put the upshot as I am about to: that one can treat a material object, such 
as a piece of paper, as a tool for producing the sensations to be found in 
the consequents of the counterfactuals that constitute it. But that is what 
it amounts to, on the phenomenalist view, and because any material 
object is constituted by (for at least all practical purposes) infinitely many 
conditionals of this kind, "[t]hese various possibilities"—that is, the mate­
rial objects—"are the important thing to me in the world. My present 
sensations are generally of little importance.. . ."  27 Material objects become 
associated with the variegated sensations they do and might produce; 
they normally end up mattering far more than the sensations, and rightly 
so, because material objects are (like security but unlike a fixed amount 
of money) not exhausted by the momentary pleasures they deliver28
Mill did seem to think of great literature as a higher pleasure, and we 
can now say why that was not unreasonable. It is the distinguishing mark 
of great literature that you can always find something new in it; in 
associationist terms, there are always more associations to be built to 
further ideas. Unlike our previous examples, the associations need not 
depend on causal connections; but like our previous examples, the further 
ideas are often enough pleasurable in their own right. An alert and expe­
rienced reader will correctly come to regard a work of great literature as 
an inexhaustible source of literary pleasure, and, eventually value it more
26 Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy [IX:183, 197]. The antecedents 
of these counterfactuals—in this exam ple, going back into the room —are naturally  to be 
understood as bearing phenom enalist analyses also. See Clarence Irving Lewis, Mind and the 
World Order (New York: Dover, 1956), 135f., for a brief statem ent of that m ore recent refor­
m ulation of M ill's view.
27 Mill, An Examination o f Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy [IX:179f.].
28 They do  no t always m atter more: we often trade in a m aterial object for the sensations, 
as w hen one consum es a piece of cake. So m aterial objects and sensations do no t quite or 
alw ays stand in the h igher p leasu re /lo w er pleasure relationship. But here there is a straight­
forw ard explanation: once the piece of cake has delivered the sensations and pleasures of 
taste, it is gone.
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than the pleasure of any one good read. (You would not trade in Vanity 
Fair for any number of airport-bookstore thrillers.) Mill seems to have 
ranked food and sex as lower pleasures, and that may display epicurean 
ineptness on his part, but he was not simply being a Victorian prude: 
presumably he failed to see how they too can be idea- and opinion­
laden —how they like great works of literature, can thereby become highly- 
connected elements of one's psychology, and eventually become recognized 
as the nondepletable sources of ever more lower-order pleasures.29
I earlier remarked that the standard formulation of the decided pref­
erence criterion does not quite get Mill right, and we can now see why. 
There is an old joke about a drunk in a bar to whom a genie grants three 
wishes. His first wish is for a bottomless pint of Guinness, and the drunk 
is so pleased with the outcome that he asks for two more of the same. If 
higher pleasures are, paradigmatically, nondepletable resources that are 
seen to serve indefinitely many further ends, then one has a higher plea­
sure or one does not, but one does not exactly have more or less of it. Mill 
introduces the notion of higher pleasures in the following passage:
If one of the two [pleasures] is, by those who are competently 
acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they . . .  
would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their 
nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred 
enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to 
render it, in comparison, of small account.30
Notice Mill's careful choice of wording: the lower pleasure comes in 
quantities, but there is no mention of any quantity, great or small, of the 
preferred (and therefore higher) pleasure. It is a mistake to think of higher 
pleasures as coming in amounts.31
29 In Proust's more exotic variation on this them e, even som ething on the order of the 
mem ory of a baked good can, if sufficiently connected to o ther hedonically charged ideas, 
be m ade into the focus of a personality and a higher pleasure. More familiarly, gourm ets 
enjoy their food as they do because of the discrim inations they are able to make; they read 
Bon Appetit the w ay other people go w indow -shopping; it is comm on enough in some circles 
to find oneself a t d inner w ith people w hose culinary enjoym ent is inseparable from the 
conversation they are having about the food they are eating, the food they have eaten on 
o ther occasions, and the food they mean to eat in the future. For the im portance of the ability 
to construct new associative links to an idea, see Elijah M illgram , "On Being Bored O ut of 
Your M ind," Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society 104, no. 2 (2004): 163-84, secs. 2-3.
30 Mill, Utilitarianism, chap. 2, par. 5 [X:211 ].
31 This is perhaps the reason that Mill is w illing to treat the h igher pleasures as a class: 
since they do not come in am ounts, Mill may be concluding that they do not trade off 
against each other. If this is w hat Mill w as thinking, however, I am not happy w ith it: 
different higher pleasures do  trade off against one another, and instances of the very same 
higher p leasure can trade off against each o ther (as when you have the option of sacrificing 
some people 's liberty to allow  liberty to m any others). M any people surely have preferences 
over such trade-offs, and Mill discusses one such trade-off himself, in On Liberty, chap. 3, 
par. 9 [XVIII:266],
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Finally, liberty is a precondition for many more immediate pleasures. It 
is nondepletable; once we have used our liberty to obtain one or another 
good, it remains unexhausted, to be used once again. A reasonably alert 
agent will come to realize this; that is, he will come to exhibit the pattern 
of associations characteristic of the higher pleasures. So he will come to 
prefer liberty to any of the alternatives for which he might trade it in. And 
that, by Mill's official definition, makes liberty a higher pleasure: some­
thing not to be exchanged for any amount of lower forms of utility.
VI. T h e  A r g u m e n t  f r o m  P r o g r e s s i v e  E f f e c t s
There must be more to this last argum ent—after all, why aren't plea­
sures predictable enough to be supplied by Huxley's administrators, and 
if they are, why bother with liberty?—and to fill it in, we need to intro­
duce two bits of Millian terminology. First, character is the cumulative 
effect of your experiential history on the pattern of associations that con­
stitute your mind. (In this sense of "character," call it the generic sense, 
everybody has one; there is a further sense, which we will take up later 
in our discussion, on which having a character is an exceptional achieve­
ment.) Second, On Liberty tells us it is going to appeal to utilitarian con­
siderations, but insists that an understanding of human beings' interests 
take account of the fact that they are "progressive beings."32 Commen­
tators have not noticed that this is also one of Mill's technical terms, and 
have largely assumed that the turn of phrase is merely another expression 
of the nineteenth-century faith in Progress. But Mill tells us that "the 
words Progress and Progressive are not here to be understood as synon­
ymous with improvement and tendency to improvement."33 A progres­
I hope to discuss this subject further on another occasion. For now, notice that one sort of 
standard  objection is evidently  m iscast: the objection that no one is alw ays going to give up 
eating for M ozart. M ozart isn 't norm ally a generic m eans to eating, and so M ozart and 
eating d o n 't stand to each o ther in the relation we have been examining.
32 Mill, On i.iberty, chap. 1, par. 11, in Mill, Collected Works,. XVIII:22L
33 To be fair, however, "here" is the System ofl.ogic (book VI, chap. X, secs. 2-3 [VIII:912ff.]). 
Mill does go on to affirm  his "b e lie f . . .  that the general tendency is, and w ill continue to be, 
. . .  one of im provem en t.. . .  This, however," he insists, "is no t a question of the m ethod of 
the social science, bu t a theorem  of the science itself." The concept is introduced in the 
chapter of the System o f l.ogic titled "Of Progressive Effects; and of the C ontinued Action of 
Causes" (book III, chap. xv [VII:509-15]). Com pare also ibid., book V, chap. v, sec. 4 [VIII:790f.], 
w here w e are told that history  show s "M an and Society" to be "actually undergoing a 
progressive change"; Mill uses the poin t as a prem ise in an argum ent against overreliance 
on empirical laws. In On I.iberty, chap. 3, par. 17 [XVIII:272f.], Mill tells us that "the pro­
gressive principle . . .  in either shape, w hether as the love of liberty o r of im provem ent, is 
antagonistic to . . .  C ustom ." A lthough he uses "progress" and "progressive" in their ordi­
n ary  senses later in the parag raph  ("w e flatter ourselves that w e are the m ost progressive 
people w ho ever lived"), the point is that "the despotism  of C ustom ," b y  im posing stasis on 
a society, m ay m ake it no longer subject to form s of developm ent characteristically produced 
by  progressive causes. C om pare the related use of the term  in Utilitarianism, chap. 2, par. 24 
[X:224], w here the fact that the h um an  m ind is "in a progressive state" explains im prove­
m ent in our practical arts; it is no t identical to the im provem ent.
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sive effect is one produced by the continuous and ongoing action of a 
cause on its object: initially for instance, the force of gravitation acts on an 
object at rest; at the next instant, it acts once again on the same object, 
which is already moving; at the next instant, on the same object, now 
moving faster than before, and so on. Likewise, "the progressiveness of 
man and society" is principally caused by "the extensive and constant 
reaction of the effects on the causes. The circumstances in which mankind 
are placed, operating according to their own laws and to the laws of 
human nature, form the characters of human beings; but the human 
beings, in their turn, mould and shape the circumstances for themselves 
and for those who come after them." Man is a "progressive being" in that 
his character is the result of stimuli applied to a character already shaped 
by stimuli. Unlike the Newtonian treatment of gravitation, we do not 
have available an elegant and precise mathematical derivation of the 
cumulative effects, because the stimuli themselves are so irregular. "Such 
[mathematical] principles are manifestly inapplicable. . .  where the causes 
themselves are in a state of perpetual fluctuation; as in . . .  the social 
science."34
By way of illustration (now of the shaping of an individual's character, 
rather than that of society): When life begins, one is equipped with a 
handful of hardwired pleasures, such as satisfying hunger; so imagine a 
psychology with only such pleasures as the initial state on which a stim­
ulus operates. When you are an infant, you become hungry, and your 
mother feeds you. This happens repeatedly, and an associative link gets 
created between the idea of being fed, and the idea of your mother. 
Pleasure traverses the link, and becomes associated with the idea of your 
mother. So now you like your mother: you enjoy her presence, and not 
merely as a means to satisfying your hunger; her presence has become 
part of what counts, for you, as happiness. Now imagine that your mother 
wears straw hats; it happens repeatedly that when you see her, you see 
her wearing a straw hat; an associative link comes to be built between the 
idea of your mother and the idea of straw hats; pleasure traverses the 
link; now you like straw hats; they, too, have become part of what counts, 
for you, as happiness. Now imagine that when your mother parks you in 
front of the television, there happens to be an advertising campaign in 
which someone wearing a straw hat drinks a particular brand of bever­
age. Ads screen repeatedly, and so an associative connection is formed 
between the idea of straw hats and that particular soft drink. Once again, 
pleasure travels down the link, and now you have acquired brand aware­
ness: Coca-Cola, perhaps, has also become part of what, for you, counts 
as happiness.
34 Mill, System o f Logic,, book III, chap. xxiv, sec. 9 [Vri:620]; com pare ibid., book III, chap. 
xxiii, sec. 3 [Vri:593f.]: "To enable us to  affirm any thing universally concerning the actions 
of classes of hum an being, the classification m ust be grounded on the circum stances of their 
mental culture and habits, w hich in an individual case are seldom  exactly k n o w n .. .
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Human beings are progressive in that the processes that shape their 
characters are path-dependent, and thus what happiness or utility con­
sists in for them is path-dependent as well. What a person's happiness is 
depends on what counts as his pleasures. A person's pleasures are deter­
mined by the vicissitudes of association-building stimuli. Since the cumu­
lative effects of these stimuli are not normally predictable in particular 
cases (it was just happenstance that your mother wore straw hats, just 
happenstance that the commercials featured models wearing them), the 
only way to accommodate those effects—the only effective way to give as 
many people as possible the chance to be happy—is to minimize con­
straints on what individuals may do.35
Notice, incidentally, that we seem to be in the neighborhood of a partial 
solution to another of Mill's problems. Mill had hoped to discover how to 
form a personality capable of resisting the corrosive effects of analytic 
introspection; such introspection had, he thought, triggered his early and 
famous "Mental Crisis." "Analysis" itself was a technical concept for Mill, 
but the problem it was being invoked to explain was this: recognition that 
an associative connection was "artificial" rather than "natural" would 
dissolve it. The distinction between "natural" and "artificial," in turn, was 
meant to capture the difference between a correctly drawn conclusion, 
and mere association. So, and returning to the illustration, since the link 
between the beverage and straw hats is merely association, when you 
stop and think about it, you stop caring about the beverage; pretty soon, 
and for the same reasons, you also stop caring about straw hats; eventu­
ally, you end up hardly caring about anything anymore, except perhaps 
being fed, and the means to being fed. But now notice that, unlike the 
miser, the individual who becomes committed to one of Mill's higher 
pleasures because he understands it to be an all-purpose, inexhaustible 
means is not making a mistake. So Millian higher pleasures should be 
expected to stand fast against the probings of an analytical mind.36
35 The im plem entation account blocks the obvious objection to the conclusion: that if 
pleasures are unpredictable, then, for all w e know, it is constraint ra ther than liberty that 
maximizes pleasure. As before, w e are bound to have our own doubts about w hether a 
variety of options m akes it more likely that people get w h a t they  w ant; it has become an 
iconic com plaint that there are five hundred  channels, bu t nothing to watch. But, as before, 
w e should  not forget that associationism is a defunct psychological theory. H ow  realistic 
should w e expect the psychological process w e have just sketched to be?
36 This is not, by any means, a fully satisfactory account even of the partial solution: it is 
difficult to cash ou t in term s of M ill's psychological machinery, because w e do  not have 
good associationist m odels for pleasures being linked to indefinitely m any o ther unspeci­
fied pleasures. We do not have a m odel for a higher pleasure persisting because one expects 
o lder and fading low er pleasures to be constantly replaced by equally ephem eral pleasures 
that are still vivid. A nd  w e do not have a good explanation for why, once all the lower 
pleasures have been introspectively sand-blasted away, the generic m eans to them  should 
persist as a pleasure. That is, w e do not have the right psychological gloss on the "perm a­
nent" in M ill's fam ous phrase, "the perm anent interests of man as a progressive being" {On 
Liberty, chap. 1, par. 11 [XVTTT:224]). For perhaps the best discussion of M ill's attem pts on the 
philosophical puzzles he took the Crisis to have raised, see C andace Vogler, John Stuart Mill's
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Mill's implementation analysis of the higher pleasures and the decided 
preference criterion is ingenious, but not entirely satisfactory, even to him. 
Tt has two major problems that T want to register now, after which T will 
return to the main line of argument.
First, Mill is attempting to engineer a device that produces lexical rank­
ings. His choice is either to use scalar hardware, in which the intensity of 
pleasure is a matter of degree and is (something like) additive, or to 
introduce a special and qualitatively distinct way of marking nodes in the 
associationist network.37 But on the first option, the device should be 
expected to fail, and on the second, it's a mystery why it should work.
On the one hand, consider the feeling of pleasure that accumulates at 
an idea of something destined to become a higher pleasure. Tf that feeling 
is qualitatively identical to the feeling found at the less-highly-connected 
ideas with which that first idea is associated, then, whatever the intensity 
of (the idea of) pleasure bound to the idea of one or another generic 
means, it is hard to see why it could not be trum ped by stacking up 
sufficiently many lower pleasures. Using liberty as our paradigmatic higher 
pleasure, we can see the difficulty to be not merely theoretical; after all, 
this is just how populist strongmen build their support base, counting on 
the public's willingness to let their freedoms go, when sufficiently many 
material enticements are on offer. Call this the stacking problem.
On the other hand, Mill seems to have been bothered by the nagging 
thought that the scalar device needed fixing, and so he experimented
Deliberative Landscape (New York: Garland, 2001); for another interesting reading of it, see 
Laurie Paul, "The W orm at the Root of the Passions: Poetry and Sym pathy in M ill's U tili­
tarianism ," Utilitas 10, no. 1 (1998).
If only the h igher and hardw ired  pleasures persist, w hy  isn 't the effect of analytic intro­
spection to produce a sort of scaffolding of a personality, w hile stripping aw ay the person­
ality itself—that is, to leave in place a concern for large abstractions like liberty, justice, and 
so on, w hile rem oving any concern for the personal and concrete goods (other than eating 
and the like) one w ould  use one 's liberty and  security to obtain? That prospect gives Mill a 
stake in understand ing  great literature, poetry, art, and so on to be h igher pleasures. Doing 
so gives h im  an initial answ er to the charge that this solution to the problem  of analytic 
introspection leaves only hollow  lives. A nd it gives him  an answ er to the w orry  that sticking 
w ith  the h igher pleasures, w hich are shared by everyone, am ounts to an endorsem ent of 
conformity: even if everyone loves liberty, and even if everyone loves great literature, they 
w ill have different favorite w orks of great literature.
For the m eantim e, and in the service of sharpening the rem aining difficulties, Mill 
announces, in the course of introducing the decided preference criterion, that "[i]t is better 
to be a hum an  being dissatisfied than  a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than 
a fool satisfied" (Utilitarianism, chap. 2, par. 6 [X:212]). The hum an  and Socratic faculties are 
presum ably valued  in v irtue  of the processes w e are discussing: because they function as 
generic m eans to further pleasurable activities and experiences. But the faculties are pre­
sum ed to be valued even w hen  the pleasurable activities and experiences do no t (or no 
longer) ensue. A nd that is presum ed to be the case even though, as w e saw, m ost people do 
no t becom e m isers, because they come to see that they are no t actually going to get m ost of 
the goods of w hich the m oney m akes them  think.
37 This sense of "scalar" is being borrow ed from Bernard W illiams, "Persons, Character, 
and Morality," in W illiams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1981), 6-8.
V II. B u g s  in  t h e  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n
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with reflecting the qualitative difference, as he thought of it, between 
higher and lower pleasures (i.e., objects of preference that are lexically 
ordered with respect to one another) in a qualitatively different mental 
state. We have already seen passages in which that thought comes to the 
forefront. To repeat a couple of them: "the idea of the cause, as cause, is 
so lost among the innumerable ideas of the pleasures combined with it, 
that it seems to become the idea of pleasure itself"; or again, the feelings 
tied to the realization that one's security is being threatened are "so much 
more intense than those concerned in any of the more common cases of 
utility, that the difference in degree . . .  becomes a real difference in kind 
. . .  assum ing] [a] character of absoluteness."38 An image that might 
serve us is that of an overloaded meter whose needle gets stuck at the 
high end of the dial.
The most important reason for thinking that Mill was seriously consid­
ering the notion of qualitatively distinctive higher pleasures is the amount 
of effort he devoted to working out the background theory, and Candace 
Vogler has done an impressive job of tracing out Mill's deep interest in 
"chemical" sciences (sciences which study effects that are qualitatively dif­
ferent from their causes). She convincingly ties the theory of chemical sci­
ences to Mill's hopes of getting qualitatively novel mental states to do one 
or another kind of work in his psychology.39 Vogler suggests that if there 
are complex ideas or trains of thought whose ingredients blend to produce 
qualitatively new states of m ind—call these blended ideas—they can under­
write the higher pleasures, thus addressing the stacking problem.
However, the qualitative differences introduced by blending do not 
explain the lexical preference for blended over unblended pleasures— 
that is, they fail to explain why blended pleasures are higher pleasures. 
Some people prefer blended Scotch whiskey, others prefer single malt; 
why should it be any different with other pleasures? Mill's clearest exam­
ple of blended ideas is colors on a spinning wheel blending into white; 
some people prefer white to other colors, but certainly not everybody; 
higher pleasures, however, are defined as those preferred by everyone 
who has experienced them.40 Briefly, the second way of solving the stack­
3S Mill claims that it is "practically im portant to consider w hether the feeling itself, of
justice and injustice, is sui generis like our sensations of colour and taste, or a derivative 
feeling, form ed by a combination of others" (Utilitarianism, chap. 5, par. 2 [X:240f.]). M ill's 
a ttem pt to trace the special qualities of the intense feeling to, especially, a qualitatively 
distinctive th irst for revenge (ibid., chap. 5, paragraphs 18-22 [X:248-50]; Mill, Analysis,
vol. 2, 325f.) looks like a throw back to Hum ean analyses of complex ideas, which claimed 
to reveal the im pressions of reflection em bedded in them  (see M illgram, Ethics Done Right, 
222-24, for exam ples from Hum e). For o ther points a t which Mill toyed with the thought 
that the higher pleasures (i.e., the mental states involved in the enjoym ent of h igher plea­
sures) m ight be qualitatively distinctive, see also note 14 above.
39 Vogler, Mill's Deliberative landscape, 74-77, 80-82. For a quick overview  of Vogler's 
agenda, see my review of her book in Ethics 112, no. 4 (2002): 880-83.
40 Mill, Analysis, vol. 1, 90-91 (Jam es M ill's discussion), and 108-9n. (John Stuart Mill, 
quoting his own treatm ent in the Examination of the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton).
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ing problem requires that blended pleasures be lexically preferred to 
unblended ones; we have no explanation at all for why they would be; 
recall from Section III that Mill is committed to providing such an 
explanation.
The second major problem with Mill's implementation analysis of higher 
pleasures is that higher pleasures such as liberty and security are not 
experienced as sensually overwhelming, except perhaps in very special 
cases. On the assumption that lexical preferences are effected by associ­
ating the idea of very intense pleasure with the idea of the preferred 
object (that is, putting to one side the blended-ideas alternative), this is a 
paradox—though not for the reason that perhaps first comes to mind.
The effect (or rather, lack of effect) can, oddly enough, be modeled by 
Mill's machinery Although the Theory of Ideas did much less work for 
Mill than for his British Empiricist predecessors, this much of it remained. 
Ideas, at any rate simple ones, were understood to be qualitative copies of 
sensations, but much less forceful or vivid or intense.41 Now, once again, 
desires are constituted, on Mill's view, by an idea of the object of desire, 
and an associated idea of (the sensation of) pleasure. So, what is traveling 
across the links that connect the idea of a generic means with the ideas of 
many pleasurable ends—and what is accumulating at the idea of that 
generic means—is not the sensation of pleasure, but rather ideas of (or an 
idea of ever-more-intense) pleasure. The etiolated mental state that, on 
Mill's account, is part of the structure of a desire explains choice, but 
cannot give rise to the vivid sensory experience of an intense pleasure. 
The implementation analysis of higher pleasures thus has a worrisome 
upshot: it suggests that higher pleasures ought to be experienced as dis­
appointing. But if a higher pleasure is found to be disappointing for long 
enough, why does one continue to desire it so fervently? Call this the 
disappointing higher pleasures problem.
My take on this cluster of issues is that Mill was aware of the problems, 
but, despite exploring a number of ways forward, never settled on one of 
them. Perhaps he was sensitive to the flaws of the solutions he saw; 
perhaps he was waiting for science to deepen our understanding of the 
psychological machinery.42 Mill did his best to be thoroughgoing in his 
empiricism, so perhaps the most principled response available to him 
would have been to allow that, like any device, the one we have sketched
41 A lthough he still seems to have thought of ideas as fainter or w eaker than  sensations, 
Mill thought it necessary to am end H um e's view  that im pressions and ideas are distin­
guished only by their degree of vivacity; M ill's official view  is that the difference betw een 
them  (as betw een beliefs, m em ories, and o ther sensations or ideas) has to be treated as a 
primitive.
42 In the Analysis, vol. 2, 252n., 254n., Mill em phatically recom m ends volum e 2 of John 
R uskin's Modem Painters (1843-1860; London: George Allen, 1906). That is, Mill w as appar­
ently also exploring art criticism for guidance on the h igher pleasures, bu t m ust no t have 
found the solutions he w as seeking. If he had, w e w ould  see m ore of R uskin's quite startling 
account w orked into M ill's later theorizing.
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is only effective in suitable ranges of circumstances. He could have claimed 
that the pairwise choices he wanted to explain (between a generic means 
and one of the items it is a means to) would be produced by this device, 
at any rate in suitable social environments. At other points in his psy­
chology where he faced structurally similar problems—distinguishing 
beliefs from ideas merely entertained, or distinguishing memories from 
other beliefs—he added the needed functionality as a primitive. Although 
it would have been a less principled response, he could have done the 
same here; however, there is no announcement to that effect, and the cost, 
as we have seen, would have been high. In any case, I am going to leave 
further exploration of the resources on which Mill could have drawn to 
another occasion.
VTTT. I n d i v i d u a l i t y
The utilitarian argument for liberty I have sketched on Mill's behalf is 
by no means bug-free, but my sense is that its problems are surmount­
able. Even the components are still usable: John Rawls read Mill carefully, 
and adapted Mill's lexical orderings and all-purpose means—the latter in 
the guise of Rawlsian "primary goods"—to a political theory that expresses 
much of the spirit of the Millian argument. Nonetheless, the argument we 
have reconstructed was not one with which Mill was willing to rest 
content.
The chapter of On Liberty in which the central argument is provided 
bears the title "Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being," 
and, in his Autobiography, Mill describes On Liberty as a whole as "a kind 
of philosophic text-book of a single truth . . . :  the importance, to man and 
society, of a large variety in types of character, and of giving full freedom 
to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and conflicting direc­
tions." 43 But while the argument we have just given allows individuality 
a pivotal role, individuality amounts in it to no more than diversity of 
character (in, remember, what I called the generic sense). As various 
commentators have noticed, there is a second and more ambitious tech­
nical sense of "character" at work in this chapter and elsewhere, one 
corresponding to the ordinary usage in which one says of someone that 
he has a lot of character, or is a real character. For reasons I will get to, I 
do not want to attempt a precise and general account of character in the 
ambitious sense, but by way of introducing the notion, we can notice that 
it is marked by "individual spontaneity"; Mill quotes Wilhelm von 
Humboldt's characterization of " 'the highest and most harmonious devel­
opment of [man's] powers to a complete and consistent whole.' " 44 "Indi­
viduality is the same thing with development," Mill writes, and character
43 Mill, Autobiography, chap. 7, par. 20 [1:259].
44 Mill, On Liberty, chap. 3, par. 2 [XVIII:261],
348 ELIJAH MILLGRAM
in the ambitious sense is the precondition of "originality" and "genius."45 
In the argument we have reconstructed, even diversity of generic char­
acter does not figure as an element of well-being, but rather as an inev­
itable and not necessarily desirable phenomenon. That (generic) characters 
differ explains why liberty comes to be a higher pleasure, but we do not 
know why or how individuality—"character" in the ambitious sense— 
matters, much less matters enough to explain the importance of liberty. 
And I am about to briefly consider a textual objection to the argument as 
I have just reconstructed it, as a way of showing that Mill's concern for 
individuality as a great good really is missing from it.
The argument had it that we need liberty because people's preferences 
and pleasures are formed "progressively." Small coincidences shape the 
evolution of people's characters in ways that cannot be anticipated by a 
benevolent despot or social engineer; because people want unpredictably 
different things, the only way to make sure they get what they want is to 
allow each person to pursue his own ends. The textual objection is that 
Mill complains of nineteenth-century British society that people do not 
want unpredictably different things; rather, "they like in crowds"; "it does 
not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is custom­
ary."46 But if individuality is not as inevitable as all that, why should 
awareness of liberty's (not all that frequent) role in satisfying idiosyn­
cratic preferences make liberty a higher pleasure?
A motif of On Liberty is that customary preferences are weaker than an 
individual's "spontaneous" preferences, and satisfying generic desires 
produces less utility overall. While Mill never spells out the details of the 
argument for this conclusion, it is predicted by the psychology. Suppose 
you think you ought to have A as your goal, and suppose, as a conse­
quence, you pay attention only or primarily to the causes and effects of A 
(rather than to the causes and effects of the pleasures you actually feel). 
If you ignore stronger potential associations in favor of weaker ones (or 
prevent yourself from experiencing them, or just fail to notice them), on 
average you will be left with only weakly pleasurable ideas—which is to 
say, with weak desires. Weak desires are less rewarding to satisfy. Indi­
vidual idiosyncrasy is not quite as pervasive as the first pass over our 
argument made out, but when it is not, the price is lower average utility.4'
45 Ibid., par. lOf. [XVIII:267],
46 Ibid., par. 6 [XVIII:264f.]; com pare John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, chap. 3, 
par. 14, in Mill, Collected Works, XXI:312f.
47 Elements of the argum ent are scattered through On I.iberty, chap. 3, paragraphs 6,14-16 
[XVIII:264f., 269-72], Perhaps this is one reason w hy Mill fretted over the w orkings of 
attention. Vogler, Mill's Deliberative landscape, 94ff„ usefully discusses M ill's w orries about 
that subject.
As the previous section suggests, there m ay be other M illian explanations as well. W hen 
you find som ething p leasurable—not independently, as it were, bu t m erely because you had  
desired it—the psychological m achinery presum ably operates as follows. To desire a slice of 
mince pie, for instance, is to associate an  idea of the slice w ith  the idea of pleasure. Now, the
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However, notice that in blocking the textual objection we do not find 
individuality turning up as a part or component of well-being, but, 
once again, merely as a means to it. Conformism slows down the pro­
cess of forming strong desires for a utilitarian regime to satisfy, and 
that may be a good enough reason to tolerate and even encourage 
diversity. But individuality is nonetheless being tolerated for the sake 
of a further end.
What has somehow gotten lost is a consideration that, not coinciden­
tally, makes only rare and awkward appearances in the discourse of 
political liberalism today: namely, that the point of political institutions is 
to make better people. Contemporary liberalism is commodity-oriented, 
in that it is directed toward giving the people what they want, and takes 
the people who have those wants as given. The agent is a consumer; the 
most important mission of a social order is to satisfy preferences, what­
ever they are; GDP—a measure of how many preference-satisfying com­
modities are produced—is thus a good rough measure of the success of a 
social order. Mill's liberalism had its roots in a much older tradition, one 
that held the most important product of one's endeavors to be, not the 
commodities one manages to consume, but oneself, and the most impor­
tant product of a society, the people in it.
If liberalism does not seem to have the resources it needs to meet the 
increasingly frequent attacks on it, that is because liberalism has forgotten 
what it was originally about: that "[i]t really is of importance, not only 
what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the 
works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and 
beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself."48
The distinctively liberal spin on this perfectionist thought is that there 
is no one pattern along which human beings are to be shaped; on the 
contrary, what matters most is that each person be able to make an indi­
vidual of himself: each person should be, as the phrase has it, an original. 
Put aside the worry that Mill's train of thought depends on a psycholog­
ical theory current in the nineteenth century, but not accepted today.49 I 
will in a moment suggest that Mill's problems in casting his concern with
idea of pleasure is not the sensation of pleasure that you w ould have, if you liked the pie on 
its ow n. W hen you taste the pie, some of the vividness or energy of the sensation (of the pie, 
not of pleasure) is transm itted to the idea of pleasure, and is likely to m ake it som ew hat 
m ore strongly felt; b u t even a m ore vivid idea is m uch w eaker than a sensation. To desire 
som ething because it is w hat other people w ant is to have, when such a desire is satisfied, 
a pleasure of this secondhand sort. So preferences or desires that arise merely from con­
form ist tendencies will eventuate in weak satisfactions.
A caveat: Recall that Mill was aw are that his fa ther's  analysis of desire w as unsatisfactory; 
it is thus hard to know how m uch w eight can be  rested on the w orkings of the adm ittedly 
flawed psychological machinery.
48 Mill, On i.iberty, chap. 3, par. 4 [XVIII:263].
49 We should not forget, as com m entators all too often do, that the a rgum ent of M ill's On 
I.iberty is therefore not an allowable part of the liberal arsenal until the archaic m achinery 
has been satisfactorily replaced.
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individuality into a lucidly articulated and compelling argument do not 
derive from that theory; his problems are our own as well.
IX. E t h o l o g y
One of the surprises of the body of work that Mill left us is an empty 
space where the keystone was supposed to be.
A great many arguments in Mill's moral and political theory turn on 
character. For instance, just to add examples to those we already have on 
the table, his Subjection o f  Women argues for feminist reforms on the 
grounds that they will improve men's characters—a reason not likely to 
be much invoked today.50 Mill objected to the secret ballot, because hav­
ing to stand up for political choices in public would improve voters' 
characters;51 he insisted that "the most important point of excellence 
which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and 
intelligence of the people themselves."52 Political and social institutions 
were to be carefully tailored to suit the collective character of a people at 
a time, and thus colonial administrations and benevolent despotisms could 
be justified in those cases where a national character would not support 
democratic institutions.53 Mill was fully aware that if these pronounce­
ments were merely pronouncements, they could not do their work in his 
arguments.54 So he proposed to inaugurate two new social sciences. The 
first phase of the research project that was supposed to tie his philosoph­
ical system together consisted of ethologi/, the science of character (not to 
be confused with the program of investigating animal behavior that went 
by that name during the twentieth century).55 The follow-on phase was to 
be political ethologi/, the science of collective or group characters. Mill had 
spent time in France as a youth, and had been impressed by the differ­
ences between (as he thought of it) what the French were like and what 
the English were like; such observations seem to have served as his par­
adigm for the subject matter of political ethology.56 By our lights, Mill was 
envisioning the startlingly misguided Science of Ethnic Jokes.
50 Mill, The Subjection of Women, chap. 2, paragraphs 4 , 12, and  chap. 4, paragraphs 4f., 10, 
13f. [XXI:288f., 293-95, 324-26, 329, 331-33],
51 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, chap. 10, paragraphs 1-3, 
in Mill, Collected Works, XIX:488; Collected Works, XV:558.
52 Ibid., chap. 2, par. 20 [XIX:390],
53 See, e.g., Mill, On Liberty, chap. 1, par. 10 [XVni:224]; com pare Mill, Autobiography, chap. 
5, paragraphs 15, 19 [1:169, 177}.
54 And political theorists do  get called on such pronouncem ents. See, e.g., the complaint, 
in Peter Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
U niversity Press, 1999), 30f., that Judith  Sklar's claims about the "salu tary  effect [of life in 
a liberal regime] on the characters of citizens" are backed up "w ith  scarcely a shred of 
em pirical evidence."
55 Nikolaas Tinbergen, The Study of Instinct (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).
5h For the differing national characters of Frenchmen and Englishmen, see, e.g., Mill, 
Autobiography, chap. 2, par. 12 [I:59f.].
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The most urgent job Mill's two new sciences were to take on was 
resolving the tension between the Principle of Utility and the Principle of 
Liberty. Even without seeing how the details of the argument are sup­
posed to go, it is clear enough that the effects of liberty on character (and 
the contrasting effects of enforced conformity and repression) are sup­
posed to supply liberty with a utilitarian justification. And our argument 
to this point has sketched a way of filling in those details which gives us 
some sense of what sort of content ethology was projected to have.
Mill executed a great deal of preparatory work for the ethological sci­
ences. Much of the System o f  Logic is devoted to working out the correct 
methodology for social sciences in which reproducible and controlled 
experiments are hardly ever possible. Mill wrote his way through an 
economics textbook, partly, I believe, as a proof-of-possibility: if econom­
ics, which faces the same methodological obstacles as ethology, has shown 
itself a viable enterprise, many of the standard objections to the viability 
of ethology are defused. The methodology worked out in the System 
required a science at its foundations with cleanly stateable and indepen­
dently verifiable principles, and Mill's associationist psychology had been 
allocated that role; I take it that this was an important reason for revisiting 
and updating his father's work in the field. All in all, there was a great 
deal of effort put into stage-setting for the sciences-to-be of ethology and 
political ethology.
X. C o n c l u s i o n
It is thus perhaps surprising that when we run our eyes down the 
spines of Mill's Collected Works, noticeably absent from the list of titles is 
anything along the lines of The Principles o f Political Ethology. Perhaps Mill 
just never got around to it; perhaps he was exhausted by his other labors; 
perhaps the Science of Ethnic Jokes was destined to remain programmatic 
because it simply wasn't possible.57 But Mill seems to have been other­
wise indefatigable, and we have seen that he had every reason to think 
that the research program was promising: his analysis of the higher plea­
sures is a general theory of the formation of certain types of character, and 
would have seemed to him to confirm the feasibility of the program. So 
I want to entertain an alternative explanation for Mill's having aban­
doned the project: that, for formal reasons, no science could have done 
what Mill needed.
Sciences produce or consist of generalizations; a science of character 
would consist of or produce generalizations about types of character. 
These generalizations would be derived using associationist psychologi-
5/ Mill does say, in a letter to Alexander Bain, that "[ejthology [is] a subject I have long 
wished to take u p , . . .  but have never yet felt m yself sufficiently prepared" (Collected Works, 
XV:645; the  letter is dated 1859).
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cal theory, and they would, in turn, be applied to demonstrate the upshots 
of one or another policy or set of institutions for utility or happiness. 
Ideally, they would show that liberty gives rise to characters of such and 
such types, and that, in a free society, people with those types of charac­
ters are going to be, as a former U.S. vice president once put it, happy 
campers.
Mill's problem arises when we add in the thought that the type of 
character we are really after exhibits "originality" and "individual spon­
taneity."58 Deeply original (and thus arbitrarily different) characters do 
not make up a type that could be the subject of scientific generalization. 
There is no such thing as the science of surprises, and consequently, the 
science of personality types will not turn out to include the science of 
surprising personalities. Consequently, neither ethology nor political ethol­
ogy will provide the lemmas needed to construct the argument that Mill 
was after—the argument to the effect that a society containing surprising 
personalities will be happier than a society that does not, and that liberty 
is required to produce surprising personalities.59 I suspect that once Mill 
realized this, he quietly let ethology lapse.
Mill's problem is our own as well. Public arguments and public com­
mitments, Bernard Williams has perceptively remarked, must be trans­
parent in a way that private deliberations need not (and often should not) 
be. Public arguments must be available to support a commitment to 
liberty, if that commitment is not to appear politically frivolous. But, 
because individuality escapes general-but-concrete characterization, it is 
hard to construct such an argument that does not somehow sidestep the 
thought that individuality itself is what is important, and what a liberal 
society is trying to promote.60
58 Mill, On Liberty, chap. 3, paragraphs 1-2 [XVIII:260f.].
59 There are traces in Mill of a further and spectator-driven train of thought: that original 
and uncustom ary characters w ill be "noble and beautiful object[s] of contem plation," and 
that "in  proportion  to the developm ent of his personality, each person becom es . . .  m ore 
valuable to o thers" (On Liberty, chap. 3, par. 9 [XVIII:266]). That is, Mill seems to be toying 
w ith  an argum ent that experienced judges w ould  find other uncustom ary individuals to be 
a pleasure, and perhaps even a h igher pleasure. Notice that the ethological sciences w ould  
no t be in a position to supp ly  the evidence for this argum ent, either. If you cannot say w hat 
original characters are like in general, you cannot dem onstrate w hat the reaction to them  
w ill in general be.
There is a half-hearted attem pt to show  that originality is an all-purpose m eans, and thus, 
presum ably, a h igher pleasure: everything w e value now  w as once an innovation, and so we 
should value innovators very  h ighly indeed. As Mill noticed (On Liberty, chap. 3, par. 12 
[XVIII:268]), and as Vogler, Mill's Deliberative Landscape, 108, has also poin ted  out on  his 
behalf, a conform ist w ill no t find this a persuasive argum ent: future innovation is a m eans 
to w hat a conform ist does not w ant. Think about hip-hop, from the perspective of a m usic 
lover of fifty years ago: an offensive vehicle for m isogyny and braggadocio, confused about 
w hether a record player is a sound-reproduction device or a m usical instrum ent, it's not (the 
m usic lover w ould  have insisted) even music. W hen novelty  really /s unpredictable, it does 
not, ahead of time, look like a benefit.
m Bernard Williams, In the Beginning Was the Deed, ed. Geoffrey H aw thorn  (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 45f. Recent attem pts to m ake the inculcation of v irtue  an
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Mill's investigation of how liberty could be justified took him down 
two distinct paths. One of these amounts to a fairly tight argument (albeit 
one which requires a now-defunct psychological theory to make it work); 
that train of thought seems to miss the point of liberalism so disappoint­
ingly that (I am suggesting) Mill eventually gave up on it. Like main­
stream contemporary justifications of liberty it is uninspiring.
The second path faces apparently insuperable difficulties in formulat­
ing its central thought in a manner suitable for a public justification, and 
Mill's missing Science of Ethnic Jokes can serve as an icon for the prob­
lem: the transparent claims needed for such a justification must be the 
deliverances of a science, broadly conceived—or anyhow an intellectual 
enterprise that functions like a science. Nothing like a science of origi­
nality and deeply individual personalities is in the offing. Because we 
cannot explain what surprising characters have to do with higher plea­
sures, the importance of what Mill called the spontaneous individual will 
almost inevitably be confined to the peripheral vision of democratic polit­
ical discourse.
Philosophy, University o f Utah
object of public policy d isplay  w h a t som e of these obstacles look like in real-life politics. For 
som e of the discussion by  policy-oriented academics, see W illiam Galston, Liberal Purposes 
(Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1991); Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern 
Liberalism; and, for an overview, Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2d ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford U niversity Press, 2002), chap. 7.
Notice that the civic virtues actually being prom oted are no t nearly  as h ard  to describe 
concretely as those w e have been considering. "A utonom y" and "toleration" are cookie- 
cutter objectives com pared to fostering genuinely surprising  personalities. W here creativity 
is the announced policy goal, w e get phenom ena like the N ational E ndow m ent for the Arts; 
even the tiny sliver of the federal budget allocated to the NEA is controversial and conse­
quently  tenuous.
